[Gluster-users] One client can effectively hang entire gluster array

Steve Dainard sdainard at spd1.com
Fri Aug 19 19:22:43 UTC 2016

As a potential solution on the compute node side, can you have users copy
relevant data from the gluster volume to a local disk (ie $TMDIR), operate
on that disk, write output files to that disk, and then write the results
back to persistent storage once the job is complete?

There are lots of factors to consider, but this is how we operate in a
small compute environment trying to avoid over-loading gluster storage

On Fri, Jul 8, 2016 at 6:29 AM, Glomski, Patrick <
patrick.glomski at corvidtec.com> wrote:

> Hello, users and devs.
> TL;DR: One gluster client can essentially cause denial of service /
> availability loss to entire gluster array. There's no way to stop it and
> almost no way to find the bad client. Probably all (at least 3.6 and 3.7)
> versions are affected.
> We have two large replicate gluster arrays (3.6.6 and 3.7.11) that are
> used in a high-performance computing environment. Two file access cases
> cause severe issues with glusterfs: Some of our scientific codes write
> hundreds of files (~400-500) simultaneously (one file or more per processor
> core, so lots of small or large writes) and others read thousands of files
> (2000-3000) simultaneously to grab metadata from each file (lots of small
> reads).
> In either of these situations, one glusterfsd process on whatever peer the
> client is currently talking to will skyrocket to *nproc* cpu usage (800%,
> 1600%) and the storage cluster is essentially useless; all other clients
> will eventually try to read or write data to the overloaded peer and, when
> that happens, their connection will hang. Heals between peers hang because
> the load on the peer is around 1.5x the number of cores or more. This
> occurs in either gluster 3.6 or 3.7, is very repeatable, and happens much
> too frequently.
> Even worse, there seems to be no definitive way to diagnose which client
> is causing the issues. Getting 'volume status <> clients' doesn't help
> because it reports the total number of bytes read/written by each client.
> (a) The metadata in question is tiny compared to the multi-gigabyte output
> files being dealt with and (b) the byte-count is cumulative for the clients
> and the compute nodes are always up with the filesystems mounted, so the
> byte transfer counts are astronomical. The best solution I've come up with
> is to blackhole-route traffic from clients one at a time (effectively push
> the traffic over to the other peer), wait a few minutes for all of the
> backlogged traffic to dissipate (if it's going to), see if the load on
> glusterfsd drops, and repeat until I find the client causing the issue. I
> would *love* any ideas on a better way to find rogue clients.
> More importantly, though, there must be some feature envorced to stop one
> user from having the capability to render the entire filesystem unavailable
> for all other users. In the worst case, I would even prefer a gluster
> volume option that simply disconnects clients making over some threshold of
> file open requests. That's WAY more preferable than a complete availability
> loss reminiscent of a DDoS attack...
> Apologies for the essay and looking forward to any help you can provide.
> Thanks,
> Patrick
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