<html><head></head><body>Ah. More data. You are doing this with containers.<br><br>Take a long hard look at OpenShift. On rhel8/centos8/fedora28+ it allows devs to run containers without having root access. It's core is kubernetes.<br><br>It's a really good idea to create users inside the containers. Devs hate this (get over it!) But it separates privileges for better security.<br><br>Data sharing between users is done with group membership. Fred has his own default group. So does Wilma. They are both also in a group Flintstone. With sgid settings, all files written in a Flinstone group folder are group Flintstone but each user owns their files. Betty and Barney are also users. Neither is in Flinstone group so they have no access. They get their group, Rubble, and Flinstone can't see those files. <br><br>If a Flintstone needs to share a file with a Rubble, a common way is to copy that file to /tmp and the current owner can then chgrp to Rubble and chown to Betty. Betty now moves that file where it's needed.<br><br>If much more sharing is needed than just a file, create a third group, neighbors, and put all 4 users in it, or experiment with groups of groups and put Flintstone and Rubble groups as members (check kernel level and version of security tools. FreeIPA can also do this) and anything in the neighbors folder gets set group id neighbors and all 4 users can see it.<br><br>SELinux is a different way to do this. It blocks users from changing group permissions and forces really solid security bits to be set that protect access. Most devs start by disabling selinux as its far more sysadmin than they want to be constrained by. It also makes a system that is historically nearly unbreakable from a data/user security perspective.<br><br><br><div class="gmail_quote">On October 22, 2019 12:12:26 AM EDT, Pankaj Kumar <pankajk81@gmail.com> wrote:<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin: 0pt 0pt 0pt 0.8ex; border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); padding-left: 1ex;">
<div dir="ltr">Hi Jim<div><br></div><div>Thanks a lot for your detailed response. Some clarifications:</div><div><br></div><div>>> If they have no sudo, they can't mount. Use a centralized authentication system like freeipa or IdM. Every user should have their own userid that's unique. No exceptions.</div><div><< Every user has a user id. And they also have sudo access to their units. Take for eg, AWS. You have a user id you login with but you get root on the Virtual Machine. We know the username but users have full access to the local machine. </div><div><br></div><div>>> Make mounts for them in fstab. Set ownership and groups on mount points so each user is restricted to their folder only. </div><div><div><< If every user has his own mount point, then how does he share anything with other users? </div><div></div></div><div><br></div><div>>> I work in HIPAA rules now, DoD clearance rules earlier. Users are not to be trusted. Other sysadmins are barely trustable. If users have any access to adjust the system configuration in any way, take it away. That's your job not theirs. It's easier to say no 100 times a day than spend 2 weeks in front of lawyers explaining why untrusted users could create a mess that involves lawyers and courts, fines and jail time.</div><div><< Very thankful of the warning. We will do our best, get outside verifications, launch prizes for hacks do everything it takes. We will only do it when we are certain. We will make sure to limit access at the higher levels. All online file sharing systems(google drive, Dropbox) do this thing. That's why we are thinking of writing a layer over Gluster possibly to achieve this.</div><div><br></div><div> >> If your OS won't support basic system security, choose something that will. Some Linux distros are not usable in a multiple user environment (kali is a prime example). I work in an Enterprise environment so I use RedHat/CEntOS.</div><div><< We are using containers and we intend to give users a choice of base images. They will be the only user on their linux.</div><div><br></div><div>>> Sorry to sound really harsh but this sounds like a nightmare that could be avoided with a better sysadmin plan. Users are terrible sysadmin. Programmers are too. Sysadmins are not very good programmers :-(</div><div><< That's what we are trying to do here. We like GlusterFS and I think we can build something on top of it with only a few tweaks. It supports ACLs already. If we could write a layer such that we force a container to be able to mount as the specified user only or not mount at all, we have what we want already.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>Thanks</div></div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Mon, Oct 21, 2019 at 8:00 PM Jim Kinney <<a href="mailto:jim.kinney@gmail.com">jim.kinney@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div>Shell access to untrusted users. I would fight that tooth and nail as a sysadmin. User that are untrusted get accounts deactivated.<br><br>If they have no sudo, they can't mount. Make mounts for them in fstab. Set ownership and groups on mount points so each user is restricted to their folder only. Use a centralized authentication system like freeipa or IdM. Every user should have their own userid that's unique. No exceptions. <br><br>I work in HIPAA rules now, DoD clearance rules earlier. Users are not to be trusted. Other sysadmins are barely trustable. If users have any access to adjust the system configuration in any way, take it away. That's your job not theirs. It's easier to say no 100 times a day than spend 2 weeks in front of lawyers explaining why untrusted users could create a mess that involves lawyers and courts, fines and jail time.<br><br>If your OS won't support basic system security, choose something that will. Some Linux distros are not usable in a multiple user environment (kali is a prime example). I work in an Enterprise environment so I use RedHat/CEntOS. <br><br>If users can't get things done with out being root, someone has really messed up the work flow design. <br><br>Sorry to sound really harsh but this sounds like a nightmare that could be avoided with a better sysadmin plan. Users are terrible sysadmin. Programmers are too. Sysadmins are not very good programmers :-(<br><br><br><div class="gmail_quote">On October 21, 2019 10:03:46 PM EDT, pankaj kumar <pankaj@datacabinet.systems> wrote:<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0pt 0pt 0pt 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="ltr">We are attaching a gluster storage to our cluster. We give shell access to our cluster to untrusted users. Each user has a folder in gluster. The problem is that the users could get to mount as any user id and then access the other users files as their own. Is there a way to authenticate a user before a mount?<div><br></div><div>If there is none, can you help us implement a thin authentication layer over mount? Where should we get started.</div><div><br></div><div>Thanks,</div></div>
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